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Subsidies for Expression and the
Future of Free Exercise
Wayne McCormack*
Along with maybe a handful of others, I tentatively believe
that Justice Scalia may have been right in Smith,' despite the
~ essence, he said that
manifold problems with the ~ p i n i o n .In
laws of general applicability may be applied to religiously
motivated practices without meeting the compelling state
interest test.3 The reason that I support this holding is that
judicial granting of religious exemptions from laws of general
applicability would be tantamount to judicial establishment of
religion. It would force the judiciary both to define religion and
to assess what are acceptable religious practices, a n
undertaking fundamentally a t odds with the spirit of the First
Amendment and with the pluralism of contemporary society.
On the other hand, my eighteenth century liberalism cries
out for protection of individual matters of conscience and rebels
a t the thought of leaving a constitutionally based liberty to the
mercy of the political process? Therefore, I find myself
waffling on the issue because I want to be assured that
individual liberty will receive sufficient protection under other
headings such as freedom of expression.
This leads me to a comparison of Smith with cases i n other
areas of constitutional law, notably freedom of expression and
* Professor of Law, University of Utah College of Law.
1. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2. Smith has received almost universal condemnation from commentators. For
two of the more devastating critiques, see Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free
Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Michael W. M c C o ~ e l l ,Free Exercise Revisionism
and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990). By contrast, only a few
authors have supported the outcome. See Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?:
Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment, 52 U. m.L. REV. 75 (1990); William P. Marshall, In Defense
of Smith and Free Erercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991);Ellis West,
The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTREDAME J.L.
ETHICS& PUB. PoL'Y 591 (1990).
Smith, 494 U.S.at 878-82.
3.
4. See id. at 890.
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establishment of religion. I find many of these cases picking up
on a t least one recurrent theme in today's world: the
elimination of government subsidies on a number of fronts.
both in the religious arena and
Individual speech-a~tions,~
elsewhere, are subject to this phenomenon. I will discuss Smith
in relation to government grants that limit abortion advice,
limitations on the degree to which government must provide a
public forum for expression, and Establishment Clause cases
that limit government subsidies to religious expression or
practices. I conclude by trying to link the Establishment Clause
no-subsidy command to these other developments, including
Smith's elimination of judicially crafted exemptions for
religious practices.
The Smith proscription of judicial inquiry into the meaning
of religion draws into question legislative exemptions and
accommodations in a host of areas, including tax exemptions
- and personnel exemptions such as those in Title VII. As farfetched as this assertion might seem, it parallels other
developments. Elimination of legislative exemptions for
religious practices may well be the next stage of separation of
church and state.

I. JUSTICESCALIA'SAPPROACHTO EXPRESSIVE
AND WORSHIPFUL
CONDUCT

A number of cases, involving not only religion but also
symbolic speech and hate speech, make it apparent that Justice
Scalia is out to rewrite First Amendment law, with the
apparent approval of a large segment of the existing Supreme
Court! The emerging nature of his First Amendment analysis
is that the Amendment creates no individual rights but instead
erects limits on how government may conduct its business. This
is not a meaningless distinction because the limit on
governmental behavior is purpose-based rather than resultbased. In Justice Scalia's view, the First Amendment prevents
government from taking action directed toward a particular
it does not protect
religious practice or subject of e~pression;~
religion or expression from 'law[s] of general appli~ability."~
This term refers to any communication by speaking or writing.
See, e.g., RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992); Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2463 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
7.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-82.
8. Id. at 886 n.3 (quoting opinion of O'Co~or,J., concurring).
5.
6.
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After reading Smith, my initial reaction was, "Okay, now
we just argue claims for religious exemptions as claims for
freedom of expression." Professor Greenawalt forecast this
approach, calling it "reductionist" because it would reduce
religion to expression.' As Professor Greenawalt also predicted,
this approach does not protect very much, a t least as Justice
Scalia would apply it.
This position is easily tested by asking whether a claim
similar to that made i n Smith-exemption from generally
applicable criminal laws for religious use of peyote-would
have prevailed as a n expression claim. Justice Scalia gave a
clear answer at the first opportunity, in Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc." His concurring opinion in Barnes, rejecting a
claim for constitutional protection of nude dancing as a form of
expression, emphasized repeatedly that government may
declare any practice unlawful. He maintained that such
declarations need be based on no more compelling grounds
than that a majority find the practice objectionable or immoral,
so long as the prohibition is of general applicability-meaning
that it is not aimed at "conduct precisely because of its
communicative attributes."ll Much of his concurring opinion i n
Barnes was taken directly from the Smith opinion, which he
acknowledged by citing Smith for the proposition that "general
laws not specifically targeted a t religious practices did not
require heightened First Amendment scrutiny even though
they diminished some people's ability to practice their
religion."12
With respect to symbolic expression, Justice Scalia quoted
language from his own dissenting opinion, written as a circuit
court judge, in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt13
(the sleeping on the lawn case):
[Tlhe only First Amendment analysis applicable to laws that
do not directly or indirectly impede speech is the threshold
inquiry of whether the purpose of the law is to suppress
communication. If not, that is the end of the matter so far as
First Amendment guarantees are concerned; if so, the court
9.

Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L.

REV.753, 756-57 (1984).
10.
111 S. Ct. 2456, 2463 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
11. Id. at 2466.
12. Id. at 2467.
703 F.2d 586 (D.C.Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting), reu'd sub nom., Clark
13.
v.. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 486 U.S.288 (1984).
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then proceeds to determine whether there is substantial
justification for the proscription.14

The most surprising part of this formulation is that no First
Amendment protection exists for the individual engaged in
expressive conduct; the only limitation is that government may
not target communication. This approach is identical to the
Smith formulation that asks, with regard to religious practices,
only whether the government purpose is to suppress
religion.'' And the Watt statement does not even require a
compelling state interest when the proscription is targeted at
communication; it merely requires a "substantial justification."
Both Smith and Barnes, then, shift away from emphasis on
the interest of the individual and move toward inquiry into the
governmental purpose. This occurs despite frequent Supreme
Court pronouncements that it will not inquire into the intent of
the legislature but will examine a law's validity on the basis of
the impact that it actually has on protected interests? I have
often told my students that defining rights is not a good way t o
think about individual liberties. We should think of the Bill of
Rights as limitations on government rather than definitions of
protected rights, and these limitations should be explored in
terms of the legitimate necessities of the governmental
enterprise. But I never meant for my students to believe that
government is free to do whatever it wishes so long as it does
not intend to suppress communication or religion; rather, I
merely intended to force the analysis to focus on the strength of
the governmental justification in a pre-weighted balancing
process.
The Scalia Smith-Barnes formulation regarding laws of
general applicability is said to apply only in the arena of
expressive conduct. Justice Scalia was careful in both opinions
t o point out that First Amendment protections require

Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2467 (quoting Watt, 703 F.2d a t 622-23).
14.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-82.
15.
See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980);
16.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968). Professor Ely and Professor
Tribe have pointed out that it is more appropriate for the Court to inquire into
legislative motive when some negative prohibition of the Constitution is at stake
than when the question is the initial power to enact the provision. LAWRENCE
H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 814-20 (2d ed. 1988); John H. Ely,
Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205
(1970). But neither Ely nor Tribe suggests that impact becomes irrelevant, as
Justice Scalia seems to indicate in Barnes and Smith.
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heightened scrutiny when "speech" is restricted, but there may
be little in this protection.17 Having seemingly created a
category of protected activity known as communication, he then
collapsed the distinction. In Barnes, he argued that "virtually
every law restricts conduct, and virtually any prohibited
conduct can be performed for an expressive purpose."18 It is
obvious that any form of communication requires the act of
speaking or writing-a "speech-act." Thus, the conduct portion
of any communication can be regulated by a "law of general
applicability'' so long as the target of the regulation is not the
expression. The result is that no constitutional protection exists
for sound trucks, picketing, or flag burning (to use Scalia's own
example^)'^ if government applies a restriction unrelated to
the message.
The rule that government cannot target communication is
said to provide comfort against conscious repression. But
expression can be either self-expression, communication with
another, or both. Under Smith-Barnes, a religious "practice"
might be protected by the Constitution fiom a regulation aimed
at communication but not from one aimed at self-expressive
acts. Focusing on the latter aspect of expression would allow
the government to target the noncommunicative portion,
despite any spillover into suppression of communication. That
is why nude dancing, even in fully consensual settings and
even recognizing its expressive components, can be suppressed
with only the justification that the majority finds it
unappealing. Under this formulation, the targeting of conduct
by the Hialeah small-animal ordinances20 would be valid
despite their impact on self-expression. What made the
ordinances unconstitutional is that they targeted a particular
form of expression precisely because of its religious nature.21
The targeting rationale can also make the First
Amendment stand for the proposition that government must
suppress in neutral fashion all communication of a certain type
if it suppresses any portion. This proposition was part of

17. Smith, 494 US. at 885-86; Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2465-66 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
18. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2466.
19. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2544-45 (1992).
See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct.
20.
2217 (1993).
21.
Id. at 2233.
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Justice Scalia's message in R.A.V. v. City of St.
the
"hate speech" case. Holding that the St. Paul ordinance was
defective because it singled out certain categories of hate
speech but not others,23 Scalia was accused by concurring
Justices of adopting a test of "underinclusiveness.~~24
Scalia
responded that he was not condemning the law for its failure to
restrict more speech, but because it singled out certain
categories of unprotected speech on the basis of their
content.25 Again, R.A.V. deals with expressive behaviorburning a cross-but the ordinance and the opinion would
reach all forms of communication with the prohibited content.
In Justice Scalia's formulation, then, government is apparently
allowed t o prohibit all speech that the speaker should know
but it is
would cause "anger, alarm, or re~entment,"~~
impermissible to single out speech that would cause "anger,
alarm, or resentment" on the basis of the listener's race, creed
or gender.27
Prior t o Smith,Barnes, and R.A.V., I told my students that
they should view all human communicative activity on a
spectrum, from "thought" at one end to "action" at the other.
The point on the spectrum at which we place a certain speechact would depend on the propensity of the statement to affect
another person. The more likely it is that the statement affects
others, the less justification would be required for government
intervention. This approach is similar, if not identical, to Judge
Learned Hand's formulation in Masses Publishing? By
contrast, Justice Black insisted on a rigid distinction between
speech and conduct,2g and the frequent approach of the
Supreme Court was to treat differently speech that had an
impact and conduct that had elements of communication. The
former could be protected under the "clear and present danger"
test while the latter could be protected to some extent under
the complex four-part O'Brien test.30
22.
112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
23.
Id. at 254247.
Id. at 2553 (White, J., concurring).
24.
Id. at 2545.
25.
Id. at 254749 (quoting ST. PAUL,MINN.,LEGIS. CODE 8 292.02 (1990) (St.
26.
Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance)).
Id.
27.
28.
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.DN.Y. 1917).
See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 476-82 (1966) (Black, J.,
29.
dissenting); see also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 372 (1970) (White, J.,
dissenting).
30.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). According to the
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I prefer my (and Judge Hand's) formulation because it
takes into account both the communicative aspects of behavior
and the behavioral aspects of communication. However, if
Justice Scalia is successful in rewriting this aspect of the First
Amendment, none of these formulations will have much
influence: Justice Black's distinction becomes irrelevant
because government can regulate the behavioral aspects of
speech, the traditional approach fails because it focuses on the
speaker rather than on government, and my formulation fails
to capture the ability of government to regulate at every point
on the spectrum so long as it does so without basing its
restrictions on the content of the speech. The only safe harbor
is the realm of the mind; once the thinker opens his or her
mouth, government obtains a regulatory power, and the greater
the restriction, the less objectionable it is constitutionally.
FOR SPEECH
11. ENDING~ V E R N M E N T A LSUBSIDIES

The laws-of-general-applicability proposition goes hand in
hand with an emerging notion, both on the Court and in the
political arena, that government subsidies are not
constitutionally compelled and indeed may be constitutionally
repugnant. The general-applicabilityconcept addresses whether
government is required or allowed to provide exemptions for
either speech or religion; the subsidy question addresses
whether government may refuse to support, or is even
prohibited from supporting, expression or religious practices.
This section looks at subsidies for speech, which will lead t o a
short discussion of the Establishment Clause in the next
section.
The primary cases in the speech area are Rust v.
Sullivans1 (upholding the "gag rule" on abortion advice),
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movements2 (striking down
some permit fees for parades), and International Society for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lees3 (upholding some
limitations on Hare Krishna activities in airports). Rust is an
Court in O'Brien, even if it is determined that conduct is "protected expression,"
the government may nevertheless suppress or regulate it if such action (1) "is
within the constitutional power of the Government"; (2) "furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest"; (3) "is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression";and (4) there are no less restrictive alternatives.
111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
31.
112 S. Ct. 2395 (1992).
32.
112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992).
33.
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example of market economics applied to the government a s a
purchasing agent for the consumer. If the government is just a
buyer, then the government merely purchases a service from a
doctor and cannot be required to pay for that which it does not
choose to buy, such as gratuitous advice and information about
abortion. This is not terribly noteworthy so long as the doctor is
not a full-time employee of the government and so long as the
government is not able to exercise market dominance, becoming
a regulator through its entrepreneurial role.
If Rust applied to a full-time employee whose entire
professional life were purchased by the governmental entity,
then state law school professors, as well as county clerical
employees, would have no claims for freedom of speech against
an employment policy restricting the subjects on which they
could speak. Traditionally, a law school professor has been told
to teach a particular class (e.g., Civil Procedure) and could be
fired for failing to teach that subject, but he or she could not be
fired for teaching either Marxist or neo-classical economic
theory as the basis for Civil Procedure. The law school
professor has even enjoyed the freedom to criticize openly the
content of Civil Procedure as well as the desirability of
teaching the course. Similarly, the county clerical employee
(although subject to a silly distinction protecting speech on
matters of public interest but not on matters of personal
interest)34 has enjoyed some right to speak even on company
time.
In both the law school and the county clerk's office (and
also in the Rust formulation) the employee is free to say
whatever he or she wishes when acting outside the zone of
employment. This freedom could quickly disappear if the
workday were redefined as a twenty-four hour day. One could
then argue that the government has purchased the entire time
of the employee and need not pay for undesired conversation.
The Rust opinion took some pains to distinguish the
purchase of services from the provision of a public forum such
. ~ ~ the Court said about the public forum,
as a ~ n i v e r s i t y What
however, was carefully circumspect and should be read in light
of other public forum cases. In the first place, the Court stated
that "the existence of a government 'subsidg' . . . does not
justify the restriction of speech in areas that have 'been
34.
35.

See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S.378 (1987).
Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1776.
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traditionally open to the public for expressive activity' or have
been 'expressly dedicated to speech activity.' "36 Maybe the
subsidy does not justify it, but, according to Barnes, public
opinion might.
With regard to public universities, the Rust Court merely
said that they are "a traditional sphere of free expression so
fundamental to the functioning of our society" that they are
protected "by the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of the
First A~nendment."~'In other words, the university and other
public fora can be subjected to controls that reflect the morality
of the majority so long as those controls are specXically stated.
What overbreadth would protect after R.A.V. and Barnes is a
mystery. The old rules on public fora permitted pure speech i n
traditional public fora unless government could find a
compelling interest to suppress such speech. A compelling
interest usually meant an interest unrelated to the expression
(i.e., time, place, and manner r e g ~ l a t i o n s ) .Now,
~ ~ nothing
prevents government from simply declaring that previously
open fora are no longer available for free speech. For example,
a public park could be closed to speeches offered to anyone
outside the speaker's family, or a university campus could
prohibit structures such as the shanties protesting South
African investments.
Other public forum cases also seem to be moving in the
direction of terminating governmental subsidies for speech
activities. The county ordinance in Forsyth County was struck
down not because it exacted a fee for parades but because the
amount of the fee was determined by the likelihood of hostile
reaction and the need for police protection.3g The implication
is that a set fee or a fee graduated only by the size of the
parade would be acceptable. More recently, in International
Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. u. Lee (ISKCON),4°the
Court returned t o the troubling problem of solicitation in public
places, particularly airports. The Court split five to four on two
different issues, with Justice O'Connor the swing vote,
upholding a ban on solicitation and striking down a ban on

36.

Id. (citations omitted).

37.

Id.
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
Forsyth County, 112 S. Ct. at 2403-04.
112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992).

38.

39.
40.
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distribution of literature in airports? Generally speaking, all
Justices agreed that there are certain areas known as
traditional public fora, some that are designated public fora,
and some that are neither." As Justice Kennedy pointed out,
however, nothing other than history and governmental choice
distinguishes among these areas.43 Therefore, a court has no
firm basis on which to overturn the managing agency's
categorization of a particular area.
ISKCON is problematic because government was not only
providing the physical forum but also the audience. The
travelers were brought to the airport for one purpose and then
became captive targets of solicitation and distribution of
literature. The airport authority believed that it was not
required to provide both the forum and the audience, that
allowing the display of information was a sufficient use of the
public forum as defined by the nature of the use to which the
building was put, and that it could protect the audience
members by restricting personal contact. According to the
shifting majorities of the Court, this rationale works only to a
limited degree. ISKCON seems to stand for the proposition that
some degree of subsidy for speech-like activities in "traditional
public fora" is required by the First Amendment, but two
points make this conclusion shaky. First, privatization of
governmental facilities could radically alter the 44tradition"
attached to various fora. Second, the choice of tradition seems
malleable by the Court itself, subject to changing majority
attitudes toward what speech activities ought to be permitted
in what places.
The Rust approach is noteworthy because it allows
government to refuse subsidies for undesired communication.
The public forum cases make the future of governmental
subsidization of communication very much a matter of judicial
attitude. Religion cases have shown a similar tendency, a t least
in the establishment context.

111. ELIMINATING
SUBSIDIES
THROUGH
THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE

Lee v. Weisman" and County of Allegheny v. A C L ~ ~
41.
Id. at 2711.
Id. at 2705-06; id. at 2711-12 (O'Co~or,J., concurring); id. at 2724-25
42.
( K e ~ e d y J.,
, concurring); id. at 2717-20 (Souter, J., dissenting).
43.
Id. at 2717-20 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
44.
112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
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both involved governmental subsidization of religious messages
on government property or government time. Lee was fairly
simple to resolve because it involved direct governmental
support of religious speech without much countenrailing
argument regarding the need for access to the forum in
question. Allegheny, on the other hand, troubled and split the
Court because of the apparent legitimacy of the claim by
religious groups for access to the forum. The Court delved
deeply into the mechanics and settings of the different displays
to determine the extent to which each represented
impermissible governmental support (variously described as
support, endorsement, or proselytization) for each
The trouble with this approach, which stems from the
"Reindeer Rule" developed in Lynch u. D0nnelly,4~is that it
makes the validity of every instance of religious access to a
public forum dependent on a weighing of facts and
circumstances by the Supreme Court.
As Dean Nichol recently pointed out, both the left and the
right are currently irritated by the lack of certainty in
constitutional adj~dication.~'The em on" test, as applied in
cases such as those involving religious displays, is a prime
target for this type of attack. The "test" is a good statement of
why some types of governmental services to religion are
inappropriate, namely those that cannot be offered without
requiring government to monitor the use of the aid to
determine whether it is being used for a sectarian purpose, but
it is not a good "test" for deciding cases. The last two prongs of
the Lemon test create a n apparent conundrum-aid must not
be used primarily for sectarian purposes, but government
cannot monitor the use of the aid. By implication, if monitoring
the use of the aid to comply with the second prong would
require governmental dictation of religious practices, then the
aid itself is invalid.
45.
492 U.S. 573 (1989).
Id. at 608.
46.
47.
465 U.S. 668 (1984) (indicating that although the Establishment Clause
would be violated by a city-sponsored cdche display, it would probably not be
violated by a display of Santa Claus and his reindeer).
48.
Gene R. Nichol, The Left, the Right, and Certainty in Constitutional Law,
33 WM. & MARYL. REV.1181 (1992).
49.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.602 (1971) (holding that government does not
establish religion if the statute or governmental practice in question (1) has a
primary secular purpose, (2) does not advance religion, and (3) does not involve
"government entanglement" with religion).
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The Lemon test is flawed, not because of the theme it
strikes, but because it is used to decide specific cases rather
than set out general rules. If Lemon were used to lay down
rules that could be applied with certainty, less ambiguity about
the test would exist. For example, in the field of education
subsidies, Lemon could stand for the proposition that payments
to parochial schools for books and supplies are permissible, but
that payments for salaries are not. The salaries fail to meet the
Lemon test because monitoring a teacher to see how the salary
is spent requires the state to determine what the teacher does
with regard to her religious beliefs. Why does the prohibition of
subsidies not apply to tuition and books for parochial schools as
well as to salaries of teachers? This reflects a more practical
accommodation to reality-state governments currently need
help to produce quality education, and the parochial schools
can provide a subsidy to government by absorbing some of the
costs of education if government also absorbs some of the
costs.50We have always allowed some subsidies to religion in
the form of municipal services,. and payments for books and
tuition can be viewed as such a neutral subsidy. Lemon works
fine as an explanation for why some categories of subsidies are
impermissible; it does not work well, however, as a case-by-case
test for particular subsidies.
With this explanation of Lemon, Lee becomes an even
easier case. A subsidy to religion provided by use of a
governmental forum for prayers at official ceremonies would
require governmental monitoring of the prayer to assure that it
is not an endorsement of a particular religion. As soon as
government involves itself in this way, it is simultaneously
trampling on free exercise and establishment rights. The notion
of an officially approved "American civic religion'"' should be
so deeply offensive to religious people as to ensure the demise
of all government-sponsored prayer.
Had it been argued in Lee that religious speakers were
entitled to have access to a public forum as in Allegheny, then
the free exercise claim would have to be answered. But Lee
does not involve a public forum. The forum there, as in most
official ceremonies or events, was not open. Appearance on the

Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395 (1983).
51. Stein v. Plainwell Community Sch., 822 F.2d 1406, 1409 (6th Cir. 1987); see
also Yehudah Mirsky, Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YATX L.J.
50.

1237 (1986).
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program was by official invitation only.52 The agenda was
limited just as much as the agenda and the right of the floor
are limited in a legislative session or a judicial proceeding. If
the agenda includes an open forum, as is sometimes the case in
a city council meeting, then government officials can hardly
censor the speech of citizens on that agenda by preventing
them from praying during the time allocated for public access.
But, as will be explained, nothing in the Free Exercise Clause
demands that a closed agenda be opened.
IV. FREEEXERCISEAND SUBSIDIES
I n essence, the Establishment Clause states t h a t
government may not subsidize religion, a t least not in a way
that favors some religions or requires governmental control of
religion. Does anything in the Free Exercise Clause demand
that otherwise closed fora be opened? First, let us compare the
Free Exercise Clause to what is required by the Free Speech
Clause. Because subsidies for religious exercise are constrained
by establishment principles, it would seem that the Free
Exercise Clause ought to contain less than the Free Speech
Clause. And we have seen that the Free Speech Clause
requires subsidies in the form of public fora only if tradition or
government choice dictates. Under this view, Smith is right
because an exemption for accommodation purposes is not
required and may not even be permissible.
It may be argued that such a statement makes too great a
leap from prohibiting subsidies to prohibiting accommodations.
The argument would claim that an exemption is not a subsidy.
But the reason for prohibiting the subsidy is the same as the
reason for prohibiting the accommodation. To administer either
would require the government to decide what is a qualifying
religious practice and to ensure that neither the subsidy nor
the accommodation is used for support of a particular religion.
That is the same two-horned dilemma posed by Lemon and is
impossible to meet in many contexts. What Smith accomplishes
is elimination of judicial control of religion or favoritism for
particular religions.
Justice Scalia seems to say that there is a good reason for
a constitutional prohibition of subsidization of religion through
the Free Exercise Clause. A constitutionally based subsidy

52.

Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2652.
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would require courts to decide what religious practices are
entitled to the subsidy, which would require courts to define
~~
religion for purposes of the American C o n s t i t ~ t i o n .Scalia
says that judicially defined religion would be unacceptable, and
good arguments support his position. A judicial definition of
religion could aasily become a n establishment. It would grant
exemptions only to religious practices favored by the judiciary.
The remaining question is whether Smith is a threat to all
government subsidies in the form of exemptions and
accommodations. If courts are not entitled to decide what
qualifies as a religion, why is the legislature or executive
entitled to make similar decisions? The First Amendment
seems to be emphatic about preventing the legislature from
making any law that tends toward (respects) an establishment
of religion. Exemptions that are not required by the Free
Exercise Clause tend toward a n establishment. Moreover, they
interfere with the self-definition of religious practice.
As a n extreme example, consider the application of Title
VII to the priesthood of the Catholic Church by elimination of
the religious exemption in Title VII. The statute would then be
a law of general applicability, not targeted at either religion or
communication. Would there be any free exercise claim for the
religious basis of the employment practices of the church? Not
according to Smith. Take the argument a step further. Is the
religious exemption unconstitutional? The Court held in
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos54that it was not.
But the anti-exemption language of Smith is difficult to square
with that result. Moreover, the institutional nature of churches
makes them even less likely candidates for exemptions than
are individual^.^^

There is a certain attraction in Smith's impetus toward
keeping the courts, and by implication the other branches of
government, out of the business of defining religion. But the
demise of governmental subsidies for expression and the
collapsing of all distinctions between speech and conduct offend
53.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 886-87.
54.
483 U.S. 327, 337 (1987).
55.
See, e.g., Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Tony & Susan
Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U S . 290 (1985); see also William P.
Marshall, The Inequality of Anti-establishment, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 70.
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my eighteenth century respect for individual liberty and
conscience. If Justice Scalia were willing to acknowledge
exemptions from governmental controls for expressive conduct
in a wide variety of circumstances, then I would agree with his
position that the Free Exercise Clause merely protects freedom
of expression. Where I part company with him is in the lack of
protection he affords to expressive conduct. He leaves us with
exemptive protections only for pure speech, a position that I
thought we had abandoned decades ago for very good reasons.
At this juncture, ending all religious exemptions would be
too much rationality too fast. Eventually, perhaps, we should
eliminate both subsidies and exemptions for religious
institutions, but more protection for individual expression
should be given in return.

